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Ii'l THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rHE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
VS. 
HARRY MAESTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 14585 
STATEME~T OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the Third District Court, in 
w~ich defendant was convicted of the crime of assault by a prisoner, 
a felony of the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on a two count information alleging that 
he committed the crimes of aggravated sexual assault and assault 
b? a prisoner. The jury acquitted him of aggravated sexual assault 
but convicted hi~ of assault bv a prisoner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Apoellant seeks an order from this Court reversing his 
c~nviction and either vacating the conviction entirely or remanding 
=~e case fer a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the trial, Michael William Hart, convicted of first 
degree arson and second degree murder (T.l3), testified that 
on January 15, 1976 while incarcerated in "C" Section of the 
maximum security facility at the Utah State Prison, he was struck 
in the face by appellant's fist. (T.l7) Hart testified he 
thought the assault was in response to his requests for money 
owed him by appellant (T.l9). He further testified that the 
appellant forced him to submit to a sexual assault (T.24). This 
part of the witnesses' testimony was not believed by the jury, 
at least not beyond a reasonable doubt, for the jury acquitted the 
appellant of this charge (T.321). 
Although several other persons testified at the trial, most 
testified to facts revolving around the sexual assault charge. 
Germain to this appeal, however, is the testimony of appellant himse: 
Appellant testified that during the month of January, 1976 
he had reason to be "jumpy" because he believed someone was tr:1ing 
to harm him. He testified that at the time of the alleged assault 
on January 15, 1976 he was sitting in "C" Section of t::e maximum 
security facility. Edward L. Cornish, another inmate was sitting 
behind appellant and appellant heard Cornish yell "watch out". 
Appellant had had earphones on watching T.V.; he felt someone 
strike him in the shoulder simultaneously with Cornish's \,·arning. 
-2-
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Appellant testified that because the individual came up behind 
his back, he feared he was in danger and struck out hitting the 
person, who turned out to be the alleged victim Michael William 
Hart. Appellant further testified he struck Hart because he 
thought he might be stabbed. (T. 213-247) 
Edward Cornish was called by appellant and confirmed 
appellant's version of the alleged assault. (T.l91-209) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COilllSEL TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS HART CONCE~~ING AGREEMENTS 
WITH THE STATE IN RETURN FOR HIS TESTIMONY DENIED 
APPELLAllT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The State's chief witness in this case was Michael Hart. 
During cross-examination of Mr. Hart by defense counsel, the 
following colloguy took place: 
Mr. Keller: And as a result of your testimony in this case 
the State has agreed to not send you back to the Utah State Prison, 
haven't they? 
Mr. Stott: I'm going to object. 
Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Keller. Your Honor. 
Court· Objection is sustained. 
~r Keller I would like to argue that point, Your Honor, 
may we do so outside the presence of the jury? 
-3-
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Court: Ask your next question. 
Mr. Keller: May we at least approach the bench on it? 
Court: Ask your next question counsel, please. 
Mr. Keller: What other agreement did you make with the 
State of Utah for your testimony, Mr.--
Mr. Stott: I'm going to object to that, there isn't any 
evidence, he is assuming things. 
Court: Objection is sustained. 
Mr. Keller: Your Honor, we are entitled to know what agreeme: 
have been made with this man in return for his testimony against the 
defendant. There is a long line of case law that allows us to do 
that. 
Court: Ask your next question counsel. 
(T.60-61) 
Appellant mainta~ns that this refusal by the trial court to 
allow defense counse2. t::J ":::-:'..:-:g ::Jut the nature of the State's agreeme: 
with the witness in return for his testimony was a denial of his 
right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him and to be allowed full 
and complete cross-examination of such witnesses. It was, also 
a denial of appellant's right to Due Process of Law pursuant to 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutio: 
and Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The precept that Due Process ::Jf La'.-J :::-equires full and complet' 
cross-examination of witnesses is so axiomatic t~at it see:ns unneces: 
to provide documentation. Cross-examination is fundamental ~-J 
preserve the right of confrontation of witnesses. .'11 thoug"l n _Xlerous 
-4-
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cases and quotations could be cited, the statement by Mr. Justice 
Burger in the majority opinion in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 
39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974) best documents the point: 
Cross examination is the principal means by which 
the believability of a witness and the truth of his test-
imony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion 
of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only 
permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the 
witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner 
has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e. discredit 
the witness .... A more particular attack on the witness' 
credibility is effected by means of cross-examination 
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or 
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly 
to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The 
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, 
and is "always relevant as discrediting the witness and 
affecting the weight of his testimony." 3AJ. Wigmore 
Evidence §940,p775 (Chadbourn rev 1970). We have recognized 
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying 
is a proper and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination. [415 US 317] 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 US 474, 496, 3 L.Ed 2d 1377, 79 S. 
Ct. 1400 (1959) 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized this important 
Constitutional concept. In State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 P. 
597 (1922) the Court said: 
"The interest of a witness in any particular case in which 
he becomes a witness may always be shown, and the effect, 
if anv, of such interest upon the weight of the testimony 
is always a question for the jury." 207 P.at 602. 
In perhaps its most recent pronouncement on the issue, this 
Court held it was error for a trial judge to have refused to permit 
defense counsel to cross-examine a witness as to his interest and 
Jias after the •.vitness disclosed that a year jail sentence was 
to be shortened in return for his testimony against another in a 
criminal case. St:J.te v. Smelser, 23 Ut. 2d 347, 463 P. 2d 562 (1970) · 
-5-
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Although the Court held this error to be non-prejudicial because 
it involved testimony which was merely corroborative,l the Court 
seemed to say that a defendant has a right to pursue the effect 
of an agreement with the state upon his testimony and it is error 
not to allow him to do so. But even more important, the decision 
seemed clear that the defendant was entitled to bring out the 
witnesses' agreement or hoped for reduction in sentence as a possible 
reason for his not testifying fairly. The Court held that the trial 
court's refusal to allow counsel to go into the subject more 
deeply was error, but not prejudicial. 
In the instant case, counsel was not even allowed to 
inquire into the witnesses' agreement with the State in return for 
his testimony, or even into what the witness hoped to gain through hi 
testimony. Based on the Smelser case, this action by the trial 
judge constituted error and furthermore this error was prejudicial 
to appellant as it was ~ot merely a question of how deeply counsel 
could question concerning the witnesses' bias, but whether counsel 
could question him at all with regard to that possible bias. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue in 
Giglio v. United States, 465 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 
763 (1972). In that case, a witness for the government testified 
falsely that he had received no consideration in return for his 
testimony against the defendant Giglio. It was later revealed that 
1. 463 P.2d at 564. 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unbeknownst to the prosecutor actually trying the case, another 
prosecutor had agreed not to prosecute the witness in another 
matter in return for his testimony. The Court reversed Giglios' 
conviction on the grounds that the perjured testimony and the 
government's failure to inform the jury of its agreement with the 
witness denied Giglio due process of law. Writing for the majority, 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated: 
"Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an 
important issue in the case, and evidence of any under-
standi~g or agreement as to a future prosecution would 
be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled 
to know of it." 31 L. Ed. 2d at 109. 
The Court in Giglio quoted from an earlier case, 
:-lapc.e v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 
1173 (1959) in which a murder conviction was reversed because 
a government witness denied he would receive any consideration for 
his testimony, when in fact he had been promised consideration. 
The Supreme Court held in (lapue that the due process cause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is violated where a witness testifies falsley 
as to the government's promises for his testimony. Mr. Chief Justice 
\-iarren, writing for a unanimous Court stated: 
. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and 
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative 
of ouilt or innocence and it is upon such subtle factors 
as ~he possible inter~st of the witness in testifying 
falselv that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." 
. 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1221 . 
~ost important to the Ctah Supreme Court's inquiry in the 
instant case. ho1.;ever. is t':-.e fact that the United States Supreme 
Courc has. ~nat l~ast t~o major cases, held that a jury is entitled 
to kno·.-; •.·:ha r: c.':t~; •, :-:c:::: i . )n. if a:cv. is promised to a lvitness in 
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extensive argument on the matter (T.249-263), the trial court 
refused to allow this instruction to be given to the jury (T.263). 
Appellant argues that the Court effectively denied him his right 
to due process of law by not allowing him to argue, nor instructing 
the jury upon, his theory of the case: to-wit that appellant 
struck Hart in self-defense. 
There was no argument concerning the accuracy of the 
language (taken directly from the statute) in the requested 
instruction (T.249-263). The Court seemed to deny the requested 
instruction because it did not believe t!".a: ·.mlawful force was 
used against appellant (T.250, 251). Appellant believes that the 
Court was in error concerning both the evidence and the law on 
this matter and by refusing to give the requested instructlon 
the Court effectively took over the function of the jury, i e 
:inding the facts of the case. 
A. 
THE EVIDE~CE 
:he witness T~omas Gurule (incorrectly spelled in the ~rial 
7::-ac.sc::-i?: as Rulae or Grulae, see T. 164-170) testified that 
::·.:::-ing ::Jid-Janua::-y of 1976 t!".at appellant •o~as "jumpy" (T.l68) · 
.:..??e:.:..ant :-:.osel:" tes:i!'"iec t!1a: c~.:ring t::-,e month of January, 1976 
-~ . .o ·.-as "'j~p/' c.nC. ::::mce:-:-,ec aj01.~: :,is perso:-1al safety due to an 
~:-:::.:e::--.: ·.::-.:.:::-. c::::·.l::-:-eC: i::--. ::-:.e :::axi:::~ sec-.~rit:; 'r:.itchen (T. 214-215). 
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Edward Cornish testified that on the date and at the time in 
question, he was in the connnon area of "C" section watching 
television with appellant; that he was sitting behind appellant 
who had earphones on, when Michael Hart walked in and into his 
(Hart's) cell; that Hart came back out of his cell with a faster 
pace toward where appellant was sitting with his back to him; 
that he yelled, "lookout Harry ~" and that appellant turned and 
apparently hit Hart. (T.l94-l96) 
Appellant confirmed Cornish's version of the events on the 
day in question. He testified that he was sitting watching T.V. 
with earphones on one ear and that he was struck on the shoulder 
from behind with some connnisary slips contemporaneous with 
Cornish's warning of "Watch out:" He further testified that he 
struck Cornish because "'1e was on me so fast I didn't know why 
he was there" (T. 218) ;..::?ellant stated that he had been stabbed 
in the back before in prison and that the combination of events 
caused him to strike Hart in self-defense (T.2l8-220). 
The sum total of this evidence then was that (a) Appellant 
was in a unique environment, prison, where one has to be more conce 
for his own personal safety than in any normal environment, (b) tha 
he had been stabbed before in prison; (c) that Hart came up behinc 
his back, struck him with some papers, however lightlv, just as 
fellow inmate Edward Cornish yelled "Lookout Harr:J' or'\~atch out'". 
(d) that he instinctively struck the man in self-defense 
Now it may very well be that the jury would not '1ave ~~li~ve 
any or all of the above listed items acted as a justifica:ian for 
-1 ()_ 
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appellant's assault on Hart, but this evidence clearly shows that 
the trial court was incorrect when it noted on the requested self-
defense instruction: 
"Refused-no substantive evidence to warrant giving 
the instruction." (R. 74 1/2). 
Since the jury was never instructed as to self-defense it was 
never able to consider the full meaning of this evidence. 
B. 
THE LAW 
As early as 1943, the Utah Supreme Court held that each party 
is entitled to have his theory of the case, if supported by 
competent evidence, submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions. 
In State v. Newton, 105 Ut. 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943) the court 
said: 
"He have held that each party is entitled to have his 
theorv of the case which is supported by competent 
evidence, submitted to the jury by appropriate 
instructions· and that the failure to present for the 
jury's consideration a party's theory by appropriate 
instructions constitutes reversible error." 
144 P.2d at 292. 
The Court reaffirmed that principle in State v. Johnson, 
112 Ut. 130, 185 P 2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Ut. 2d 70, 
457 P.2d 618 (1969); and State v. Gillan, 23 Ut. 2d 372, 463 P.2d 
S~l (1970) The Castillo case is especially important for our 
incuiry here. In that case, this Court reaffirmed the now-axiomatic 
principle that a defendant in a cr~minal case is entitled to have 
the jurv instructed on his theory of the case by saying: 
-11-
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"Both the State and defendant agree that a defendant is 
entitled to have a jury instructed on his theory of the 
case, if there be any substantial evidence to justify 
giving such an instruction." 457 P.2d at 620. 
In Castillo, this Court was called upon to review a case in 
which the defense had requested a self-defense jury instruction 
in an assault with a deadly weapon case; which request was refused 
by the trial court. Although the Court did not precisely rule on 
that issue, it held that: 
.. we are unable to conclude that the result of this 
case would have been different had the jury been 
instructed on the question of self-defense " 
457 P.2d at 620. 
Despite that holding, the Court enunciated clearly when a 
self-defense instruction should be given by a trial court: 
"If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict 
with the State's proof, be such that the jury may entertain 
a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-de£~ 
he is entitled to have the jury instructed fully and clearly 
on the law of se::-~efe~se. Conversely, if all reasonable 
men must conc::.-lce :·-.a: che evidence is so slight as to be 
incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's 
mind as to whether a defendant accused of a crime acted in 
self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are properly 
refused." 457 P.2d at 620 
It is helpful to see what facts the Court relied on to 
affirm the judgement in that case: 
"Defendant admits that he barged into his victim's 
dwelling, a victim whom he had previously beaten. 
He came armed with a knife in anticipation of trouble, 
although his sole ground for apprehension was his 
observation of a stick under a couch cushion on a prior 
occasion. He claims that he has absolutely no recollectior. 
of his victim being stabbed but merely hypothesizes that 
apparently she sustained wounds to two diverse parts of 
her body while he was legitimately exercising his right of 
self-defense." 457 P.2d at 620. 
-12-
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It seems clear that the facts in that case differ 
significantly from the instant case where the appellant and the 
victim shared a common outside cell area; appellant was not armed 
"in anticipation of trouble"; and the alleged assault was not by 
a man with a weapon upon a woman. It seems clear from Castillo's 
facts that a self-defense instruction was not proper, but those 
facts are far removed from the facts in the instant case. 
It is clear that appellant was entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case and the facts discussed in 
Part A of this Point outlined a situation in which a trier of fact 
could reasonably have believed appellant struck Hart, in self-
defense. The trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense 
constituted prejudicial error and appellant believes he should be 
entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons previously presented, appellant urges this 
Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
-13-
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